Joint Nordic Statement by Mr. Carl Mörner, Councellor
at the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations
UN Disarmament Commission 2026
9 April, 2026

I have the honour to deliver this saga on behalf of the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and my own country, Sweden.

Please allow me to start by expressing our full support to you. We regret that we could not conduct the UN Disarmament Commission as planned, but we thank you for your remarkable job so far, and we look forward to the continued work with all delegations. 

Chair,

The Nordic countries are firm supporters of a rules-based international order, effective multilateralism, and a strengthened disarmament and non-proliferation architecture enhancing security for all.

Needless to say, we meet in a point in time where our disarmament and non-proliferation architecture is severely challenged, including increasingly high tensions and a resurgence of nuclear rhetoric. Aggression and uncertainty have led to a time of new rearmament. The question of acquiring nuclear weapons has surfaced in the public debate in several non-nuclear weapons states – unthinkable only a decade ago.

In our part of the world this is most clearly exemplified by the actions of Russia in its unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, 
which illustrate that Russia has prioritised its war effort over both its UN and its non-proliferation and disarmament obligations and commitments. 

In addition, ongoing proliferation in the DPRK continue to undermine regional and global security. The DPRK’s persistent development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities violate multiple UN Security Council resolutions and remains a source of great concern. 

Furthermore, we have for many years expressed our concern by Iran’s nuclear programme and its lack of transparency. Reduced access for the International Atomic Energy Agency has seriously undermined international oversight. Iran must never be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, and full IAEA access is essential to ensure that the programme remains exclusively peaceful.

Finally, China’s rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal contributes to this complex situation and to our concerns.

Chair,

The NPT review conference is set to start in just two and a half weeks. The conference is an opportunity to celebrate the role of the treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament regime. For over five decades it has provided security benefits to all States Parties, including the nuclear safeguards system of the IAEA. It has played a central role in the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, facilitating international cooperation in this field. 

This year also marks the 30th anniversary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It has established a central norm of non-testing, and its International Monitoring System already contributes to verification. The Treaty’s normative strength cannot substitute for the permanent, non-discriminatory, verifiable, and legally binding prohibition on all nuclear weapons test explosions, and other nuclear explosions, that will be established upon its entry into force. Once the treaty enters into force, further verification measures would be available. We urge all remaining Annex II states to promptly ratify the Treaty.

The Nordic countries are firm supporters and financial contributors to both the IAEA’s activities and the CTBT’s International Monitoring System.

Chair,

For the deliberations in this body, we believe there is room for convergence, if we focus.
In what was Working Group 1, we would have suggested focusing on four areas, which are all imminent, but also are issues where there is scope for broad agreement.

First being measures to reduce the risk of nuclear weapon use. While not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, risk reduction contributes to the prevention of nuclear war, can play a major role in creating trust, confidence and predictability, and complements disarmament and arms control efforts. The current deteriorating security environment demands urgency in this area. A nuclear war would truly visit devastation upon all humankind. 
Arms control is essential. The greatest powers, who have the largest nuclear arsenals, have a special responsibility. We call on China, Russia and the United States to lead in advancing meaningful arms control initiatives and note with interest the recent proposal by the United States.

The second area is Negative Security Assurances. NSA’s serve as a concrete element on the way towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in violation of the binding security guarantees of the Budapest Memorandum, dealt a heavy blow to the credibility of NSAs.  These play an important role in strengthening the non-proliferation regime, as a risk reduction measure, and for advancing nuclear disarmament. 

The third area is transparency, verification and irreversibility. These concepts increase confidence, strengthen existing agreements and are practical tools needed for disarmament. They are instruments promoting trust and allows for incremental – step-by-step – progress towards our common goal. 

The fourth area is an early start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. An FMCT is one of the most documented and actionable priorities towards the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Limiting future production is essential. But for an FMCT to be truly effective as an instrument for disarmament, existing stocks should also be addressed.

Chair, 

Last year’s discussions in what was Working Group 2, showed both the breadth and the complexity of emerging technologies. These technologies are transforming every disarmament file. They amplify risks, blur boundaries between civilian and military domains, and at the same time offer new opportunities, not least concerning verification and monitoring efforts. 

Ensuring responsibility and accountability requires effective oversight across the full life-cycle of such technologies, from design and development to deployment and use. The Nordic countries believe the UNDC would have been well placed to articulate cross-cutting principles for the responsible development and use of emerging technologies in international security.

We were encouraged by several areas of broad convergence last year. For instance, that international law, including IHL and human rights law, applies and that meaningful human control, accountability, and responsibility must remain at the centre of decisions involving emerging technologies — especially in the military sphere. 

Another area worthy of continued discussions are the broader military applications of autonomy and artificial intelligence, beyond autonomous weapon systems. We welcome the bilateral US–China affirmation that decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons must stay under human control. This principle should become universal.

Building on our previous discussions, and as we look forward to future deliberations of the UNDC, the Nordic countries support more outcome-oriented discussions that could complement other ongoing processes such as the Open-Ended Working Group for Outer Space, the Working Group to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and the working group on LAWS in the framework of the CCW.

Equally important, peaceful uses of emerging technologies should remain part of our deliberations. Building on the Pact for the Future, we support capacity building, bridging digital divides, enabling safe and secure access to digital tools, and responsible management of dual use concerns. Effective, trustworthy export controls are essentials in preventing proliferation and diversion, including to non-state actors, while ensuring that legitimate, peaceful technological development and trade are not impeded. 

We would also like to stress the importance of an inclusive multi-stakeholder approach. The private sector, academia, technical communities, and civil society are essential partners. 

Chair,

The UN Disarmament Commission was created as a deliberative body tasked with making recommendations on pressing disarmament issues. The mandate is clear, but the working methods can certainly be improved. We support the ideas contained in the Franco-German non-paper, and we look forward to discussing these proposals at our earliest convenience.

Chair, 

Allow me to finish where I started, the Nordic countries always stand ready to work constructively with all delegations to deliver meaningful, concrete and consensus-based recommendations. 

Thank you.